By John Rogers

Revitalised by President Connolly’s presidential campaign last November, the prospect of a Left Alliance has gained traction. At the same time, the prospect, albeit distant, for an alternative to FF/FG has emerged, with the Áras race serving as a dry run for how left-leaning parties might collaborate on the ground. The challenge is whether they can turn that cooperation into broader growth, rather than simply cannibalising one another?
While a single poll gives a snapshot in time, consistent, long-term polling allows us to merge data and explore emerging trends with a robustness that can’t be achieved in standalone polls. This longitudinal approach allows us to delve deeper into specific cohorts and uncover emerging trends within the Irish electorate.
As such, we can explore whether we are seeing early signs that the seeds of a left alliance may be germinating, along with the significant barriers it faces.
A left alliance has been teased out for several years without gaining real traction, but the prospect can’t be ignored now, given evidence of what can be achieved when these parties cooperate. The success of the presidential campaign, combined with missteps in government candidate strategy, appears to have contributed in part to a modest rise in support for left‑leaning parties.
Analysing RED C Business Post Poll data from the last five years, the combined datasets compared to the first two months of 2026, validate this momentum. Combined ’26 polls first-preference share currently puts all left-leaning parties at 44%, up from 40% in 2025 and 38% in 2024.
It’s important to note that this recent momentum reflects recovery rather than a breakthrough. At the height of Sinn Féin’s popularity in ’22 and ’23, the combined support of left-leaning groups was approaching 50% of voters.
It would be wrong however to conflate the entire block of support of left-leaning parties at its high point, with voters in favour of left-leaning policies in Ireland.
Many don’t vote in Ireland based on a left-right paradigm, and the ceiling of support is reflective of broader discontent with the status quo, mainly on issues such as housing and the cost of living.
Then what’s accounting for this voting bloc not reaching the same highs as previous years, despite recent steady growth? There are several factors at play, many of which relate to the collapse in Sinn Féin support, who consistently polled in the mid-30s during the middle of the last government.
A proportion of Sinn Féin’s support from those highs that moved away as the election approached, didn’t vote in support of government, but shifted instead towards Independents and Aontú. Some left due to issues relating to ‘wokeness’ and immigration. Others were left-leaning young voters dissatisfied with housing, broke more towards centre-left parties in the 2024 GE. Of course, many simply didn’t turn out to vote at all.
It is widely recognised that Sinn Féin draws support from across the political spectrum. For the moment, then, it is useful to narrow the lens to the other left and centre‑left parties, excluding Sinn Féin.
If we strip out SF voters, and focus on a the more left leaning parties including the Social Democrats, Labour, Green Party and People Before Profit; their combined support is currently at 20% of the electorate so far in 2026, 3 points up on their 2025 average.
Support for this left leaning bloc is largely dominated by those aged in younger age groups (18-34), with a third of people in this age group giving them their first preference vote, an 8-point increase on the 2025 average.
This growing youth vote relative to last year, is predominantly at the expense of FF/FG, who dropped a combined 6-points versus their 2025 average
Support amongst older groups for these parties combined however remains relatively muted, ranging between 13% and 16% over the last 5 years.
The driving force behind this smaller left-leaning voter bloc is undoubtedly the Social Democrats, who are averaging 10% support through 2026, up 3 points from their 2025 average. While the support here also skews towards 18-34-year-olds, upward movement is evident across all age groups, and among both urban and rural voters.
The other parties have been relatively stable over that time.
At this stage, it’s unknown how a left alliance might present, and there is little concrete organisation or strategic coordination beyond the Connolly campaign. It remains to be seen whether it would be a ‘soft alliance’ that promises transfer pacts and keeping the powder dry for establishment candidates, or something much harder involving coordinated strategies and candidate placement on the ground.
Collaborating, however, affords all of these parties with high-potential second- and third-tier transfer prospects, if they can show voters compatibility or a shared vision.
Ultimately, the prospect of a left alliance hinges on the ability of either the Social Democrats or Sinn Féin to galvanise enough support from the centre, drawing away from both Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael without the Greens, Labour or PBP becoming collateral damage.
Broadening their appeal to older voters, who tend to be less influenced by housing concerns or progressive ideological arguments and more likely to show loyalty towards incumbents, will be essential. Given the current global economic volatility, Ireland’s dependence on FDI, and uncertain horizons, perceived inexperience may also be an obstacle.
The May by-elections will be insightful, providing a glimpse of how these left-leaning parties stay clean, while also vying for the same pool of voters. Battling for a single seat naturally limits coordination opportunities. Still, the by-elections may serve as early proof-of-concept for transfer pacts, while building on evidence from the Connolly campaign that the left in Ireland may yet unify.
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By John Rogers